In English law, nerve shock is a psychiatric illness or injury suffered by a person by a deliberate act or negligent or negligent person. Often psychiatric disorders are triggered by witnessing accidents, such as injuries caused by parents or spouses. Although the term "nervous shock" has been described as "inaccurate" and "misleading", it continues to be applied as a useful abbreviation for complex concepts. The possibility of recovery of damage to nerve shock, mainly due to negligence, is very limited in English law.
Video Nervous shock in English law
Definisi
To sum up in law for "nervous shock", the psychiatric damage suffered by the plaintiff must go beyond emotional distress or pressure for a recognized mental illness, such as anxiety neurosis or reactive depression. Damage to grief suffered as a result of the wrongful death of a close person is contained in the 1976 Fatal Accidents Act, while the court may also provide compensation for "pain and suffering" as a result of physical injury.
Maps Nervous shock in English law
Shock shock deliberately caused
It is clear in English law that someone who deliberately and without good reason causes other emotional distress will be responsible for the following psychiatric injury. An example of this is a bad practical joke played on someone who triggers a serious depression on the person. Joker is meant to cause the emotional pressure of others and will be responsible for the medical consequences.
Accidentally create nerve shock
Before the plaintiff can recover the damages caused by his nerve shock as a result of the defendant's negligence, he must prove all elements of the negligence:
- The existence of maintenance obligations, namely the duty of the defendant not to cause nervousness to the plaintiff;
- The offense against the assignment, ie the act or omission of the defendant in such a situation falls below what is expected of a reasonable person in the situation.
- The causal relationship between offense and psychiatric illness, nervous shock is a direct consequence of the offense of the defendant's duty;
- Nerve shock is not too far away as a consequence of the offense.
Fearing that the false acts and responsibilities of the accused are not limited to those who may suffer nerve shock in one form or another, the British courts have developed a number of "control mechanisms" or limits of responsibility for nerve shock. This control mechanism usually aims to limit the scope of the responsibility of the defendant not to cause nerve shock, as well as to causation and remoteness.
The main victim
"The main victim" is someone who is physically injured or may be physically injured because of the defendant's negligence. An example of this is the plaintiff involved in a car accident caused by the careless driving of the accused and getting minor injuries (or even remaining unscathed) as a consequence, but the fear of the accident triggers a serious mental state. Such a complainant can recover damages for his car, his little wound and the nerve shock he suffered. Rescue workers (such as firefighters, police or volunteers) who put themselves on the path of danger and suffered mental shock were consequently used to be "the main victims", until the decision at White v Chief of Police from the South Yorkshire Police explained that rescuers do not have a special position in law and must prove a reasonable fear as a consequence of exposure to danger. Secondary victims
The "secondary victim" is a person suffering from nerve shock without being exposed to danger. An example is the audience in the race car, who witnessed a terrible accident caused by negligence on the part of the car manufacturer and developed a neurological disease as a result of his experience. In these cases, the court is very reluctant to compensate for being nervous. In some decisions, the court has identified several strict requirements for the recognition of maintenance tasks not to cause nerve shock, as well as causation and remoteness:
- Plaintiffs should see "shocking events" with their undetectable senses, as eyewitnesses to the event, or hear the event live, or see "soon after". This requires close physical closeness to the event, and will usually exclude events watched by television or informed by third parties.
- Surprises should be a "sudden" assault rather than a "gradual" on the nervous system of the claimant. Thus, plaintiffs who develop depression from living with families harmed by accidents will not be able to recover damages.
- If nerve shock is caused by witnessing the death or injury of another person, the plaintiff must show a "close enough" relationship with the person, usually described as "the closeness of love and affection". Such relationships are considered only between parents and children, as well as spouses and fiancés. In other relationships, including siblings, the bond of love and compassion must be demonstrated.
- It must be natural that a person with a "normal hardness" in the plaintiff's position will suffer psychiatric harm. The closer the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, the more likely he will succeed in this element. However, after it was shown that some psychiatric damage could be suspected, it does not matter that the claimant is particularly vulnerable to psychiatric illness - the defendant must "take his victim when he finds it" and pay for all the consequences of neurological shock (see Rules "Shellfish Shells"). Therefore, an observer can rely heavily on compensation for psychiatric shock, unless he has witnessed something so horrible that anyone can be expected to suffer a psychiatric injury as a result. However, it seems that such a case is purely a theory (see McFarlane v. EE Caledonia Ltd , where the plaintiff watched the rig blast where he and his partner worked, but did not receive compensation).
Leading
Leading cases today include two House of Lords decisions arising from the Hillsborough debacle:
- Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310
- White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 A.C. 455
and the third House of Lords decision in the case arising from road traffic accidents:
- Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155
See also McLoughlin v O'Brian <1982] 2 All ER 298, where the House of Lords described the concept of "soon after" accident and Attia v British Gas plc QB 304, where the Court of Appeals considers whether the damage to nerve shock as a result of witnessing the destruction of property can be recovered. Critique
The current position of the British courts has been criticized for leading to unfair results both in law and from a medical standpoint. For example, it may be arbitrary that a mother who witnesses the death of her child with her own eyes can recover if she develops a mental illness, while who hears her child's death on the phone and suffers the same conditions can not.
Reforms have been widely advocated and in 1998 the Law Commission has drafted proposals, suggesting i.a. that the requirements of proximity in time and space for accidents and the rules of the "senses themselves without permission" should be abolished. The Department of Constitutional Affairs rejected the recommended legislative reforms in 2007, noting that the courts have adopted a more flexible approach, and propose to leave this area to court. In July 2009, the Ministry of Justice confirmed that it did not intend to proceed with the recommendations of the Law Commission in this field.
See also
- British lawsuit law
- Intentional deliberate emotional stress
External links
- House of Lords Judgment at White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
- Saying nerve shock: does the pendulum swing in favor of recovery by television viewers ?, Ramanan Rajendran, [2004] DeakinLRev 31
Note
Source of the article : Wikipedia